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I. Abstract 
 
 A combination of higher oil production as well as higher oil prices is creating oil 
revenue windfalls for some Sub Saharan African countries.  If well managed, these 
revenues have the potential to reduce poverty and bridge the development gap; if not they 
could lead to Dutch disease and an increase in income inequality.  Our research examines 
the potential impact of government expenditure on the nontraded sector and its 
implications on production and wages in other sectors.  Not surprisingly our results show 
that government’s nontraded expenditure leads to a reduction in output of other sectors 
and a decrease in the wages of these sectors leading to Dutch disease and income 
disparity.  A tariff applied to protect a leading part of the traded sector could in the short 
term reduce the negative impact and help raise wages in the protectable sector.  However, 
in the medium term, once learning by doing is introduced, the potential benefit of the 
tariff was minimized.  When these oil windfalls diminish in the long term the tariff has a 
definite negative impact on the protectable sector. We conclude that some Sub Saharan 
African countries could consider applying a tariff in the short term to reduce the impact 
of the nontraded expenditure on the traded sector of the economy.  This tariff is not 
recommended for medium or long term and it should be associated with infrastructure 
investments to support the country’s comparative advantages.   
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II. Introduction 
 
The presence and development of any valuable resource in any country, and 
especially in developing ones, is an opportunity for these countries to develop and 
provide their citizens with a better quality of living.  A globally demanded resource, if 
well managed and transparently utilized, can help pay government debt, reduce budget 
deficit, and bridge the gap to better development.  At the same time, mismanagement of 
this same resource can lead to social unrest, monetary imbalances, and fiscal disparity.  
Twelve sub-Saharan African countries have been endowed with varying reserves 
of crude oil and natural gas.  These countries are: Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Congo, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, Sudan, Mauritania, Sao Tome, Cote D’Ivoire, 
Cameroon, and Equatorial Guinea.  Some of these countries have been producing oil 
since the 60’s, others have only started recently and some will come into production in 
the near future. 
Proven crude oil reserves in this part of the world have been growing.  
Exploration and investments have increased in several countries as well.  The sharp 
increase in production coupled with the current record oil prices, and assuming that prices 
stay relatively high, will secure these countries large gross hydrocarbon revenues and 
subsequently higher government take from these revenues.  However, what are the 
economic implications of this unexpected wealth?  Will this boom lead to poverty 
elevation and faster development or would these revenues be mismanaged?  
This paper will first present a picture of the current and expected windfalls of the 
energy sector in Sub-Saharan Africa oil exporting countries.  Following that we will 
examine previous macro-economic research and management policies recommended to 
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help these countries manage these resources.  Then we will present a simple model to 
study the potential impact of the hydrocarbon windfall on the productive sectors in the 
economy and local households’ income.  This model extends recent treatments of the 
Resource Curse to a multi-period four sector disaggregation of the economy to enable 
analysis of issues directly relevant to the structure of African oil exporters.  The model 
will later be further developed to examine the implications of a potential tariff to protect 
part of the tradable sector under both conditions of full employment and conditions of 
unemployment.  Finally, Angola will be taken as a study case and the model’s theoretical 
results will be empirically tested to evaluate our conclusions and offer policy advice that 
may help reduce income disparity and promote poverty elevation in Sub-Saharan oil 
exporting countries. 
III.  Oil Reserves, Production, and Revenues in Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
 
According to the BP Statistical Review1, as of December 2004 the above 12 
countries2 combined carry about or 4.7% of the global proved crude reserves3 (Figure 1).  
In the last 12 years, despite aggressive production in several of these countries, proven 
reserves have more than doubled (110% increase).  The growth of these reserves has 
outpaced the industry average elsewhere in the world.  On average, global proven 
reserves have increased only 12% in the last 12 years.  In all other regions proven 
reserves have either started to decrease or are increasing at around a third of the rate in 
                                                 
1 Putting energy in the spotlight. BP Statistical Review of World Energy December 2004. 
2 The review states that there are no proven barrels of oil in Mauritania and Sao Tome, however we know 
that oil was discovered in Sao Tome and Mauritania. 
3BP defines proven reserves as estimated quantities of oil which geological and engineering data 
demonstrate with reasonable certainty to be recoverable in future years from known reservoirs under 
current economic and operating conditions 
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Sub-Saharan Africa.  The region has additional potential for finding more reserves and 
development of current resources.  Furthermore, the geographical location of these 
reserves (mostly in West Africa) increases their importance to major consumers, like the 
US and Western Europe, in view of the fact that these reserves are closer (and therefore 
somewhat less costly to transport) and an alternative to Persian Gulf oil. 
Ten Sub-Saharan countries are currently exporting oil.  In 2006 they will be 
joined by Mauritania.  Production in Sao Tome will come later as little or no 
development has occurred in the discovered fields.  In 2005 the cumulative annual 
production of these countries was around 2 billion barrels, a 26% increase from 
production in 2000 (1.57 billion barrels).  By 2010, production is forecast to increase by 
more than 40% to reach more than 2.8 billion barrels.  Overall, by the end of this decade 
Sub-Saharan oil production would have increased by around 80% from the 2000 levels.  
Figure 1 illustrates this sharp increase; production after 2010 will depend on finding new 
reserves (exploration) and further developing current resources.  Initial data expects a 
sharp decline after 2010; however, based on historical experience, with proper licensing 
and management and capital investments in exploration and development, production 
could continue to increase until 2015 or even 2020 and the inevitable decline that will 
follow will be slow. 
Each country’s proven reserves and 2005 production is presented in Table 1.  
Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Gabon are declining producers.  
These four countries combined will supply around 135 million barrels in the year 2010 
less then than they were supplying in 2000.  Another producer that has been recently 
declining is Congo, however new discoveries and mainly more investment in developing  
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Figure 1: Total daily oil production in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Table 1: Basic estimates of Sub-Saharan oil production in 2000, 2005, and the forecasted 
production in 2010; and the ratio of proven reserves to 2005 production.4  
Country Production mbl/yr 2000 
Production 
mbl/yr 2005 
Production 
mbl/yr 2010 
Proven Reserves to 
2005 Production 
Ratio 
Angola 268 453 870 19.4 
Cameroon 41 31 14 12.8 
Chad 78 48 26 18.6 
Congo 102 96 105 18.8 
Cote d’Ivoire 4 20 29 5.1 
Dem. Rep. Congo 10 6 0.4 29.8 
Eq. Guinea 45 139 100 9.2 
Gabon 97 95. 55 24 
Mauritania 0 0 50 0 
Nigeria 860 969 1384 36.4 
Sudan 71 129 184 48.9 
                                                 
4 Figure 1 and Table 1 are taken from the World Bank ESMAP Knowledge Exchange Series: Macro-
Economic Impact of Oil Revenues on Sub-Saharan Africa by Ahmad Slaibi; July 27, 2005. 
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current resources will lead to an increase in future production.  Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial 
Guinea, and Sudan are the fastest growing producers in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Production 
in these four countries started in the 90’s; however these producers gained importance in 
the last few years as more fields came into production.  These four countries, in addition 
to the new producer Mauritania, will supply at least an additional 240 million barrels in 
the year 2010 more than they were producing in 2000.  Finally, most of the increase in 
crude production in sub-Saharan Africa will be in the two mature producers: Angola and 
Nigeria.  These two countries will supply an additional 1.127 billion barrels in 2010 more 
than their production in 2000.     
The second column in the Table 1 shows how many years of proven production 
can be sustained at the 2005 production levels.  Proven reserves include only oil that can 
be extracted with reasonable certainty using current technology; that does not include oil 
that could be discovered or even additional oil that ultimately can be recovered from the 
current resources.  Nevertheless, given the current cumulative production, even under 
optimistic assumptions, existing sub-Saharan proven reserves could be depleted in less 
than 25 years.  Production in these countries will continue to increase so unless new 
reserves are added, sub-Saharan oil supply will significantly decrease in 15 years. 
 This increase in reserves and production coupled with the current increase in 
hydrocarbon prices is creating huge revenue windfalls for these countries.  In the period 
2000 – 2005, total governments’ take from oil revenues in sub-Saharan Africa summed to 
more than $186 billion.  In the next five years, assuming oil prices at $50 per barrel the 
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total governments’ take will be more than $430 billion.5  A higher price scenario ($80 per 
barrel) increases total governments’ take to $670 billion.6   
 In 2005, if we assume the annual price averaged $50 per barrel, gross oil revenues 
dominated the economies of most of these countries (Table 2).  Oil revenues, oil exports, 
and the subsequent government take constituted a large portion of the GDP, total exports, 
and total government revenues of countries like Angola, Chad, Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, and Nigeria.  For these countries oil revenues were more than 80% of 
total government revenues and most of their exports.  Other countries like Sudan, 
Cameroon, and Democratic Republic of Congo are also highly dependent on oil.  Oil 
revenues in these three countries were less than 30% of GDP; however they composed 
more than 30% of government revenues and a significant portion of their exports.  Only 
in Cote d’Ivoire, were oil revenues a relatively limited portion of the economy.  In the 
case of Mauritania, when production commences in 2006 we expect oil to constitute 
around 30% of the 2006 GDP and 60% of the 2006 exports.   
The last column in Table 2 shows the division of governments’ oil takes in 2005 
per capita for all the countries under study.  The share of every man, women, and child in 
countries like Congo, Angola, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea will be $512, $1010, $2062, 
and $6963 respectively.  For countries with large populations such as Nigeria and Sudan 
these figures are $248 and $128.  Only in Chad, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, and Cote d’Ivoire are the annual per capita takes expected to be less than $100.  
These numbers show the potential of the hydrocarbon sector to help develop these 
 
5 Prices assumed: $50 in 2006 and they increase at an annual rate of 2.5%.  Formula used:  
Pt = P(t-1)*(1+2.5/100). 
6 Prices assumed: $80 in 2006 and they increase at an annual rate of 2.5%.  Formula used:  
Pt = P(t-1)*(1+2.5/100). 
 
 
Table 2: Basic estimates of the impact of oil revenues in 2005 on the economies of oil exporting countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.7
Basic Estimates of Oil Revenues on the Economies of Oil Exporting Countries 
Country Gross Oil Revenues 
as % of GDP 
Gross Oil Revenues as 
% of Exports 
Gov. Take as % of 
Total Gov. Revenues 
Government Oil Take/ 
Capita US$ 
Angola 84 98 97 1010 
Cameroon 11 38 40 69 
Chad 82 na 83 29 
Congo 76 88 88 512 
Cote D'Ivoire 7 15 10 15 
DRC 8 35 42 5 
Eq Guinea 89 na 95 6963 
Gabon 57 81 85 2062 
Nigeria 60 94 83 248 
Sudan 29 na 80 128 
 
 
                                                 
7 Table 2 is taken from the World Bank ESMAP Knowledge Exchange Series: Macro-Economic Impact of Oil Revenues on Sub-Saharan Africa by Ahmad 
Slaibi; July 27, 2005. 
countries and reduce poverty.  This potential could be a unique opportunity as oil prices 
may not stay this high8 and oil reserves will not keep on expanding forever.  This 
window of opportunity will most likely last around 30 years (even less for most of these 
countries) to manage their resources successfully and partially bridge the development 
gap. 
IV. Literature Review 
 
Historically the economies of most oil exporting countries in the developing 
world have grown at a slower rate than resource poor countries.  This has been supported 
by Ranis (1991), Sachs and Warner (1995), Auty (2001), and Gylfason (2001).  Some of 
the reasons that can help explain this phenomenon include: government corruption, 
mismanagement of revenue windfalls, and Dutch Disease.   
Resource rich developing countries are also countries with higher incentives for 
government corruption.  Eifert, Gelb, and Tallroth (2002 and 2003) examine the fiscal 
policy and economic management of oil exporting countries within a political science 
framework.  They compare the performance of these countries and identify some of the 
factors that have lead to better management of oil revenues.  The study concludes that the 
political economy (democracy, civil rights, transparency,…) rather than technical factors 
have had more impact on the success of managing rents.  The authors recognize maturing 
democracies as a process to better revenue management and advise oil exporting 
countries to hold large reserves, to adopt more conservative and transparent budgeting, 
and to transfer parts of rent to individual citizens during boom periods.  
                                                 
8 Slaibi, A., Chapman, D., and Daouk, H., (2006) propose that oil prices have been historically stable in a 
range that guarantees suppliers reasonable and stable revenues without hindering economic growth of 
consumers. They argue that oil prices varied between $15- $20 from 1986 to 1997 and $23 - $30 from 2000 
to 2003 and that prices in the future may fall again into a new calmer framework. 
The main problems in managing oil revenues is estimating the future stream of 
these revenues and making spending/saving decisions.  In most oil exporting countries, 
annual oil revenues are a large portion of government income.  This means that 
estimating future revenues and stabilizing the inflow of oil revenues is crucial to reducing 
risk and smoothing expenditure.  Mashayekhi (1998) examines the impact of oil revenues 
on the growth and sustainability of the public sector in oil exporting countries.   
Governments spend oil revenues on development projects but in future years, when these 
revenues are not necessarily there, more money is needed to maintain and operate these 
projects.  The study concludes that public spending should be conservative and 
sustainable and recommends privatization of public enterprises, promotion of private 
enterprises, and strengthening the tax system. 
The spending/saving choice is another important problem.  Oil revenues are an 
exhaustible resource that must be shared with future generations; in order to ensure 
intergenerational fairness some portion of this rent must be saved for new generations to 
enjoy the benefits.  Devlin and Titman (2004) discus the optimal savings and investments 
strategy for oil exporting countries in the context of stabilizing oil funds.  They examine 
different established funds to explore their potential benefits in stabilizing expenditure, 
distributing revenues over longer periods of time to reduce market impact, and managing 
oil price uncertainty.  They conclude that although these funds helped manage windfalls 
and create productive investments, the funds were only partially successful in reducing 
the impact of oil price volatility and consequently stabilizing government revenues.  The 
authors following Engel and Mellor (1993), Larsen and Varagis (1996), Claessens and 
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Duncan (1993), and World Bank (1999) recommend using financial market instruments 
to solve this problem.9
The third reason that could explain the poor economic growth in oil rich 
developing countries is Dutch Disease.  Spending oil revenues can help reduce poverty 
and develop infrastructure in developing countries.  However, spending these revenues 
has also negative effects on other sectors of the economy.  These effects have been 
described as the Dutch Disease or the Resource Curse and were examined mainly in the 
early and mid 1980’s (after the sharp oil price increase in the early 1980’s). 10  Simply, 
these effects could be summarized as: the increase in government oil revenues and their 
subsequent expenditure on the non-traded sector leads to a shift of resources (labor) from 
the productive sector (tradable) to the non-tradable sector; and in addition, these revenues 
lead to an appreciation of local currency making local tradable production more 
expensive compared to the rest of the world and hence this country loses their 
competitive advantage in the tradable sector.11  
More recently this topic has gained interest as some new countries have come to 
enjoy the “curse” of natural resource abundance.  Howard (2002) examines the 
relationship between exports, imports and income in the economy of Trinidad and 
Tobago after the discovery of hydrocarbons.  The study concludes that the economy is 
driven by petroleum exports and that in turn has lead to a boom in the non-tradable sector 
and an increase in overall income.  Kyle (2002) similarly examines Dutch disease in Sao 
                                                 
9 These instruments include swaps, futures, and options.   
10 Cordon and Neary (1980), Forsyth and Kay (1980), Neary and Purvis (1982), Bruno (1982), Bruno and 
Sachs (1982), Cordon (1984), Wijnbergen (1984, 1984, and 1985), and Krugman (1987) are some of the 
best research on this topic.       
11 In the short run, the tradable sector will be negatively impacted as resources are drained away from it and 
it becomes less competitive. In addition, in the long run even if the oil revenues stop there is a loss of 
know-how that could revive this sector.  
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Tome e Principe.  He recommends investing oil revenues productively such that the 
country’s comparative advantages (mainly the agricultural sector) are supported.  He 
believes this will guarantee improving efficiency and productivity in a tradable sector and 
an equitable distribution of the revenues that will lead to poverty alleviation.   
Several governments in West Africa are currently considering applying or 
increasing tariffs to protect their local traded sectors.  The proposal to apply a tariff to 
protect the tradable sector in a country has been studied extensively over the past half 
century.  The impact of a tariff on wages was initially examined by Stolper and 
Samuelson (1941), Metzler (1949), and Bhagwati (1959) among others.  Mussa (1974) 
and Burgess (1980) reexamined the potential of applying tariffs to protect the tradable 
sector and they reached the same conclusion: tariffs in the short term helps the traded 
sector where as it hurts this sector long term as it shifts resources from the unprotected to 
the protected industries.  More recently Galor (1994) and Dinopoulos and Segerstrom 
(1999) examined the same problem taking into consideration new economic insight 
(either overlapping generations or skill acquisition rates).  Although neither advocated 
protectionism, Galor establishes that imposing a tariff could lead to an increase in welfare 
level in a small over-lapping generations economy; Dinopoulos and Segerstrom show 
that tariffs will increase wages for unskilled labor however it retards the development of 
human capital as in the long run it increases the fraction of the population remaining in 
the unskilled category.   
We believe that new research is needed to reexamine the Dutch Disease question 
using current economic methods within the framework of an open economy that has 
lowered trade barriers and increased capital mobility.  Hausmann and Rigobon (2003) is 
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an excellent example of such research, they examine the different theories used to explain 
the “Resource Course” and provide an inefficient specialization model that examines the 
impact of government expenditure on the non-tradable sector.  The study shows that the 
economy will suffer from higher interest rates on non-tradables, lower capital and wages, 
and a more depreciated exchange rate.   
This paper uses the Hausmann and Rigobon model as a good starting point to 
further develop the resource curse and better explain the factors at play and their 
respective implications.12 We are convinced that the resource curse problem in Sub-
Saharan oil exporting countries is not labor availability or scarcity of land and capital.  
The problem is a resource curse that is negatively impacting wages and production in the 
tradable sector leading to the unemployment of resources and migration from the rural 
areas to urban areas where the non-tradable sector is booming.  This problem leads to 
pressure a government to take steps to mitigate adverse consequences for traded sectors 
suffering from these problems, such pressure often takes the form of protectionism; 
indeed we have seen precisely this in the past in Nigeria where rice imports were banned 
for a short period.  
Our model addresses this issue directly by dividing the tradable production into 
two sectors: one worth protecting and one that is not.  We assume that labor mobility is 
not perfect and that wages differ from one sector to the other.  We will examine the 
implication of a tariff in such an economy on households and the productive sectors.  
Later on in the paper we will relax the assumption that the economy is at full employment 
and examine the implications on production and poverty alleviation.  Medium and long 
                                                 
12 The model assumes that production is divided into only tradables and non-tradables, there is one kind of 
households, economy is at full employment, and labor mobility is perfect (hence wages are equal in all 
sectors). 
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term implications of the tariff will be also examined under the learning by doing and 
returns to infrastructure scenarios.  Finally, we will consider Angola as a study case and 
examine the implications of our model. 
V. Modeling Oil Revenue Impact on the Tradable and non-
Tradable Sectors 
 
The model we use assumes inefficient specialization in an economy that has four 
sectors: protectable tradables, unprotectable tradables, non-tradables, and minerals (oil, 
gas, diamonds …).  The protectable tradable sector is a promising sector of the traded 
economy that employs a significant amount of local resources and produces an output 
that is insufficient to satisfy local demand and hence still needs to be imported.  In 
addition, it  can often be a sector whose growth has significant implications for poverty 
alleviation given the structure of production and consumption if, for example, it is 
dominated by a traded staple grain or some similar commodity.  On the other hand the 
unprotectable tradable sector is made up either of small industries that produce tradable 
goods in small quantities (i.e. mostly imported from outside world) or the industries that 
are currently exporting to the outside world.13  The mineral sector consumes no local 
inputs and generates income only for the government.  This income along with other 
revenues coming from the sale of other raw minerals, as well as aid and international 
loans are spent by the government mostly on non-tradables but also on the two kinds of 
tradable goods.  This is a reasonable characteristic of oil production in Sub-Saharan 
Africa where it is operated as a virtually self contained enclave (there is no use of 
domestic factors of production).  The model assumes that production in the country can 
be divided into protectable tradables, unprotectable tradables, and non-tradables.  On the 
other hand consumption is driven by four factors: households that earn their living in the 
protectable tradable sector, households that earn their living in the unprotectable tradable 
                                                 
13 Our assumption divides the tradable sector into two parts: the protectable tradable goods’ sector and the 
unprotectable tradable goods’ sector.  The labeling “protectable” does not mean that it is currently 
protected; rather it is the subject of protectionist pressures which may or may not result in an actual tariff. 
Our goal is to analyze the consequences following each possible path.  
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sector, households that earn their living in the non-tradable sector, and government 
expenditure.  
The model will be analyzed in three consecutive periods.  The above assumptions 
hold in all periods.  In period one, we will examine the impact of the revenue windfalls 
on the different production sectors, study the effect of government consumption of the 
nontradable goods on wages in the tradable sector, and examine the potential impact of a 
tariff to protect the protectable tradable sector.  In period two, we include a learning 
factor in our model and assume that the productivity of labor increases due to learning by 
doing.  This is intended to model time dependent productivity effects which may affect 
certain sectors as maintaining adequate levels and qualities of  human  capital is 
dependent upon production patterns in a given period.  Productivity in the nontraded and 
protectable tradable sectors benefit from learning by doing; whereas, the unprotectable 
tradable sector suffers from “dislearning” by doing.  We will examine the potential 
impact this might have on our results and whether the tariff is still beneficial in such a 
scenario.  In period three we assume that the windfalls diminish and that the economy 
enjoys returns to infrastructure investments made by the government in the previous 
periods.  All sectors will benefit from the returns to infrastructure investments.   
A. Impact of Revenue Windfalls on Local Economy (Period One) 
 
i. Production 
 We will assume that the protectable tradable (P), unprotectable tradable (U), and 
non-tradable sectors (N) are composed respectively of NP, NU, and NN small firms that 
are price takers.  Similar to Hausmann and Rigobon we assume that these firms use 
capital and labor (l) to produce yP, yU, and yN.  Total production of protectable tradables, 
unprotectable tradables, and non-tradables are respectively YP, YU, and YN.  We assume 
that capital investment is irreversible and it is treated as a fixed factor that is specific to 
the industry in which it is used.  Labor is the only mobile factor of production and neither 
consumers nor firms save.  The firms require one unit of capital to produce and their 
production functions are: 
 
yP = lP(1-α)    and            YP = NP *  yP      (1) 
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yN = lN(1-α)    and            YN = NN *  yN      (2) 
yU = lU(1-α)    and            YU = NU *  yU       (3) 
 
Firms are assumed to be profit maximizers and subsequently they solve: 
 
 max  PP* lP(1-α) –WP*lP        (4) 
 
where : PP are the prices of protectable tradables 
  WP are the wages paid in the protectable tradable sector 
Solving for profit maximization (first order conditions give): 
 
WP = (1 – α) * lP-α * PP         (5) 
Hence: 
lP = [(1 – α) * PP / WP] 1/α         (6) 
and 
yP = [(1 – α) * PP / WP] (1- α)/α         (7) 
and therefore profit is: 
πP =  [α / (1 – α)] * WP * [(1 – α) * PP / WP] 1/α      (8) 
 
Similarly, firms in the unprotectable tradable sector solve:  
 
 max  PU*lU –WU*lU         (9) 
 
where : PU are the prices of unprotectable tradables 
  WU are the wages paid in the unprotectable tradable sector 
Solving for profit maximization (first order conditions give): 
 
WU = (1 – α) * l-α U * PU         (10) 
Hence: 
lU = [(1 – α) * PU / WU] 1/α         (11) 
and therefore production becomes 
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yU = [(1 – α) * PU / WU] (1- α)/α        (12) 
 
Similarly, non-tradable firms solve: 
 
 max  PN*lN –WN*lN         (13) 
 
where : PN are the prices of non-tradables 
  WN are the wages paid in the non-tradable sector 
Solving for profit maximization (first order conditions give): 
 
WN = (1 – α) * l-α N * PN         (14) 
Hence: 
lN = [(1 – α) * PN / WN] 1/α         (15) 
and therefore production becomes 
yN = [(1 – α) * PN / WN] (1- α)/α        (16) 
 
ii. Consumption 
 We assume that the three different kinds of households and the government are 
the only sources of consumption in the economy.  The households are three kinds: some 
earn their income from working in the protectable tradable sector (proportion θ of the 
households), some earn their income from working in the unprotectable tradable sector 
(proportion π of the households), and some earn their income from working in the non-
tradable sector (proportion (1 – θ – π) of the households).14  Consumers are not taxed and 
they do not directly benefit from oil revenues, in addition consumers derive no utility 
from government consumption.  The households derive utility from consuming 
protectable tradables (CP), unprotectable tradable goods (CU), and non-tradables (CN).  
The utility function is Cobb-Douglas with equal weights on protectable tradable, 
unprotectable tradable, and non-tradable consumption.  
 
                                                 
14 The existence of households that earn their income from labor in two or three sectors was included in our 
initial model however it complicated the calculations and did not alter results or conclusions and hence it 
will not be discussed here.  
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The households that earn their income from the protectable tradable sector solve: 
max  CβU*CγP* C(1-β-γ)N            (17) 
st  PP*CP + PN*CN + PU*CU ≤ WP*lP
 
The first order conditions give: 
 
CPP = γ*WP*lP / PP          (18) 
CPN = (1 – γ – β)*WP*lP / PN         (19) 
CPU = β*WP*lP / PU          (20) 
 
The households that earn their income from the unprotectable tradable sector solve: 
max  CβU*CγP* C(1-β-γ)N            (21) 
st  PP*CP  + PN*CN + PU*CU ≤ WU*lU
 
The first order conditions give: 
 
CUT = γ*WU*lU / PP          (22) 
CUN = (1 – γ – β)*WU*lU / PN        (23) 
CUU = β*WU*lU / PU          (24) 
 
Similarly, households that earn their income from the non-tradable sector solve: 
max  CβU*CγP* C(1-β-γ)N            (25) 
st  PP*CP  + PN*CN + PU*CU ≤ WN*lN
 
The first order conditions give: 
 
CNP = γ*WN*lN / PP          (26) 
CNN = (1 – γ – β)*WN*lN / PN        (27) 
CNU = β*WN*lN / PU          (28) 
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The government consumption is its total revenues15 (TR) divided into (TRP, TRU, 
and TRN) spent respectively on protectable traded, unprotectable traded, and non-traded 
goods.  Hence, government consumption of the traded and non-traded goods (GP, GU, 
GN) is equal to total revenue spent on that sector divided by the respective price.16  
 
GP = TRP / PP           (29) 
GN = TRN / PN          (30) 
GU = TRU / PU          (31) 
 
iii. Equilibrium 
In the following analysis, we will try to quantify the impact of government 
expenditure on wages and output of the tradable sectors.  Following that we will examine 
the potential effect of a proposed tariff to promote the protectable tradable sector.  There 
are two equilibria in our model that are of interest.  The non-tradable sector must clear as 
these goods or services cannot be imported and hence demand for non-tradable goods 
must be equal to the output of that sector.  In addition, the combined expenditure of the 
households and the government must be equal to the income generated from production 
of traded and non-traded goods as well as the expected revenues of the government.  
 
a. Clearing of the non-Tradable Sector: 
 
Total consumption of non-tradables becomes: 
θ*CpN + π*CuN +(1 – θ – π)*CNN +GN = [(1 – γ – β)*[θ*Wp*lp + π *Wu*lu + (1 – θ – π)*WN*lN] ]/ PN +GN (32)  
 
Consumption of non-tradables must be equal to production: 
[(1 – γ – β)*[θ*Wp*lp + π *Wu*lu + (1 – θ – π)*WN*lN] ]/ PN +GN = NN*[(1 – α)*PN /WN] (1- α)/α  (33) 
 
Simple cross multiplication and rearrangement give: 
                                                 
15 We are assuming that government revenues include mostly oil revenues, revenues from the sale of other 
natural resources, and international aid or loans.  
16 We assume that government spending on these goods is allocated a priori regardless of the prices of these 
goods. 
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 WP =  NN*[(1 - α)/WN] (1- α)/α *P1/α N – (1 – γ – β)*[π *WU*lU + (1 – θ – π)*WN*lN] – PN*GN    (34) 
    (1 – γ – β)*θ* lP    
 
It follows that: 
 
PN = [(1– γ– β)*θ*lP*WP + [π *WU*lU + (1 – θ – π)*WN*lN] + TRN]α / Nα N*[(1-α)/WN] (1- α)  (35) 
 
Equation (34) shows that wages in the tradable sector (whether it is protectable or 
unprotectable) are negatively impacted by any and all amounts of money that accrue to 
the government and are spent in the non-tradable sector.  This negative impact could help 
explain the shift of labor from the tradable sector to the non-tradable one.  This shift is 
usually manifested in many countries by the migration from rural (mainly tradable 
agriculture sector) to urban areas (mostly services and non-tradable production).  On the 
other hand, equation (35) shows, as expected, the increase in government spending in the 
non-tradable sector would lead to an increase in the price of non-tradables. 
 
b. Equating Total Expenditure and Total Income  
 
Total Expenditure is equal to: 
θ*(PP*CP+PN*CN+PU*CU)+π*(PP*CP+PN*CN+PU*CU)+(1 – θ – π)*(PP*CP+PN*CN+PU*CU)+PP*GP+PN*GN +PU*GU  (36) 
 
Total Income is equal to: 
PP*YP + PN*YN + PU*YU + TR        (37) 
 
 
Equating (36) and (37): 
 
PP*CP + PN*CN + PU*CU + PP*GP + PN*GN + PU*GU = PP*YP + PN*YN + PU*YU + TR (38) 
 
 
But the value of non-tradable good demanded equal that supplied:  
 
PN*CN + PN*GN = PN*YN         (39) 
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Thus, the above factors of the equation can be cancelled.  Equation (38) becomes: 
 
PP*CP + PU*CU + PP*GP + PU*GU = PP*YP + PU*YU + TR    (40) 
 
PP*(CP + GP – YP) = PU*(YU – CU – GU) + TR     (41) 
 
 
Using simple calculations gives: 
 
YP =  PP*(CP + GP) + PU*(CU + GU – YU) – TR     (42) 
 PP
It can also be written as: 
 
YP =  PP*CP + PU*(CU – YU) – TRN       (43) 
 PP
 
Equation (43) shows that as government expenditure on non-tradables increases it 
will have a negative impact on the total production of protectable tradable goods 
produced in the country.  Notice also that as expected if the government spends all these 
revenues on unprotectable and protectable tradables and nothing on non-tradables (i.e. 
TR = PP*GP + PU*GU) the output of the tradable sector increases with this expenditure.   
 
B. Implications of a Tariff on the Protectable Tradable Goods 
 
i. Impact of the Tariff on the Protectable Tradable Sector 
Another method to reduce the impact of government non-tradable expenditure 
could be to increase PP (by applying a tariff).  To examine the impact of raising the price 
of protectable tradables on output we derive equation (43) with respect to the price of 
protectable goods (presented in equation (44)).  If the country exports more unprotectable 
tradable goods than it imports (in value) than equation (44) is very likely to be positive 
and an increase in PP leads to an increase in the output YP.  However, this scenario is 
unlikely, since we know that the country imports more than it produces unprotectable 
tradables; therefore the sign of equation (44) depends on the difference between 
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government expenditure on non-tradables and the value of the imports of unprotectable 
tradable goods and change (negative) of protectable good consumption.   
 
∂YP / ∂PP = ∂CP / ∂PP + [TRN – PU*(CU – YU)] / P2P        (44) 
 
In addition, an increase in PP will also lead to an increase in consumption of 
alternatives (substitution effect); hence CU will increase causing more negative impact on 
YP.  However, the government’s tariff revenues will be mostly spent on non-tradables; 
hence TRN will increase as well.  Therefore, if the government income and subsequent 
expenditure on the non-traded sector is larger than the value of the country’s 
consumption of imported unprotectable goods then increasing the tariff on protectable 
tradable goods would reduce the impact of the government’s non-tradable expenditure on 
the total production of tradable goods and hence lead to an increase in the output of YP 
(i.e. if the reduced government’s income effect is larger than the substitution effect then 
increasing PP will increase YP).  We do know that for some of these countries this is the 
case (later in the paper this will be demonstrated for Angola). 
Therefore, we have established that given the right conditions applying a tariff on 
the protectable tradable sector will increase output as well.  The following analysis will 
examine implications of this tariff on the other sectors in the economy and more 
importantly on the total income available for household expenditure. 
 
ii. Impact of the Tariff on the Unprotectable Tradable Sector 
In order to calculate the impact of an increase in PP on the output of the 
unprotectable sector, let us first determine total consumption of the unprotectable tradable 
goods.  To do that we need to sum the consumption of the three different kinds of 
households (sum equations (20), (24), and (28)) and replace the summation of 
households’ income by total income from production: 
 
θ*CU +π*CU +(1 – θ – π)* CU + GU  = β*(θ*WP*lP +π *WU*lU + (1 – θ – π)*WN*lN ) / PU + GU (45) 
CU = [β* (PP*YP + PN*YN + PU*YU) + TRU] / PU       (46) 
∂CU / ∂PP = β* YP / PU          (47) 
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 Equation (47) is always positive; thus any increase in PP would actually lead to an 
increase in the consumption of the unprotectable tradable goods (this is expected due to 
substitution effect).  However, this increase in consumption will not necessarily lead to 
an increase in production in that sector since this is after all a traded sector.  Therefore the 
two possible impacts are either an increase in imports (IU) or an increase in production of 
unprotectable tradable goods.  More importantly PU will not change as it is traded and no 
tariff has been imposed.  However, if we assume that the economy is not at full 
employment (which we know is the case in all the above countries) then this increase in 
demand will at least be partially supplied locally.  This means YU will have to increase, 
taking into consideration equation (3) means the increase will either be: in the number of 
firms supplying these goods, in the amount of labor used, or in the wages.  
 
iii. Impact of the Tariff on the non-Tradable Sector 
Similar to the unprotectable sector we expect an increase in the consumption of 
the non-traded goods due to substitution.  Total consumption of the non-traded goods is 
the summation of equations (19), (23), and (27) given by: 
 
CN = [(1 – γ – β)* (PP*YP + PN*YN + PU*YU) + TRF] / PN      (48) 
∂CN / ∂PP = (1 – γ – β)* YP / PN         (49) 
  
 In the non-traded sector there are no imports and hence this increase will have to 
be supplied locally.  This could only be achieved by either an increase in PN or an 
increase in YN.  Similar to the unprotectable traded sector any increase in YN means the 
increase will either be: in the number of firms supplying these goods, in the amount of 
labor used, or in the wages.  
 
iv. Impact of the Tariff on Total Households’ Income 
 We have seen the potential impact of a tariff on the potential output of each 
production sector; however how will the different households be affected?  The total 
amount of money available for households’ expenditure (E) is equal to the total income 
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generated from production of traded and non-traded goods in the country.17  Hence, total 
consumption (C) is equal to total expenditure (we assumed no saving) equal to: 
 
E = PP*YP + PN*YN + PU*YU         (50) 
 
We have proved that PP as well as YP will increase; also either PN or YN will 
definitely increase.  PU will stay the same; YU can stay the same but most likely will 
increase.  Therefore the combined income of all households will increase significantly.  
However, will all the different households benefit from this tariff?   
 
v. Impact of the Tariff on Firms’ Demand for Labor 
 
The exact impact of any tariff application on the other two sectors of the economy 
will depend on the general supply of labor.  We know that the tariff will lead to a 
substitution effect that would increase demand of unprotectable and nontradable goods.  
This demand increase can either be fulfilled by increasing supply (needs more labor) or 
by increasing prices of these goods.  Hence if local economy is at full employment (L) 
prior to the tariff, the increase in PP could lead to an increase in the prices of alternative 
goods and a reallocation of labor instead of enlarging the current sectors from 
unemployed resources.  In such a scenario, the economy will: 
    
max  PP*YP  + PN*YN + PU*YU       (50) 
st  YP = NP *  lP(1-α)   =  LP(1-α)       
YN = NN * lN(1-α) =  LN(1-α)      
YU = NU *  lU(1-α) =  LU(1-α)       
 LP + LN  + LU  = L 
 
Taking first order conditions and solving for the industry demand of labor: 
 
 
                                                 
17 As we have assumed that oil revenues go directly to the government. 
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LP =   L         (51) 
 [(PN)1/α * ( PP)-1/α + (PU)1/α * ( PP)-1/α + 1] 
 
LN =    L* (PN)1/α * ( PP)-1/α       (52) 
 [(PN)1/α * ( PP)-1/α + (PU)1/α * ( PP)-1/α + 1] 
 
LU =  L * (PU)1/α * ( PP)-1/α       (53) 
 [(PN)1/α * ( PP)-1/α + (PU)1/α * ( PP)-1/α + 1] 
 
The derivative of the above demand function with respect to PP shows that only 
∂LP / ∂PP will be positive.  Hence, as predicted by the Stolper Samuelson Theorem there 
will be a shift in resources (labor in our case) from the two unprotected industries to the 
now protected one.  Hence, such a tariff will have mixed results, although protecting one 
sector will increase wages in this sector, this protection is unsustainable since it will shift 
resources from the exporting and non-traded sectors hindering their growth.    
We believe that none of the countries being examined is at full employment.  On 
the contrary unemployment is a major problem in many of these countries particularly in 
areas devoted to non-oil traded sectors.  If the economy has unemployed human resources 
then the increase in demand for any of the above goods can be readily supplied by 
increasing production without any increase in the price of unprotectable and nontradable 
goods.  In such a scenario, only the protectable goods will exhibit an increase in prices.  
We believe that this is a more realistic view of the potential impact of the tariff on the 
labor market equilibrium.  In the remainder of this paper we assume that the economy is 
not at full employment and hence any increase in the demand for any good is offset by an 
increase in the supply of that good; hence prices wouldn’t change (except prices of the 
protectable traded goods which will increase due to the taxation).  
 
vi. Impact of the Tariff on the Different Households 
The exact impact of a tradable goods tariff on the overall welfare of the three 
representative households in our model is complicated because it depends on the 
consumption basket for each household in every country.  In our case study, we shall 
 26
quantify this impact on each of the different households.  One thing is certain, as our 
primary analysis below shows households that earn their leaving from the protected 
industry will benefit.  
Let us assume that the households that work in the protectable tradable sector 
actually work in agriculture and hence own the output.  Thus, plugging equation (5) in 
the constraint of equation (17) gives: 
 
max  CβU*CγP* C(1-β-γ)N            (55) 
st  PP*CP  + PN*CN + PU*CU ≤ (1 - α) * lP-α * PP * lP = (1 - α) * PP * yP
 
If we assume that farms produce a lot more of the tradable good than they 
consume, then any increase in the price of the tradable good will lead to an increase in the 
disposable income of these households.  On the other hand, households that work in the 
unprotectable tradable sector and the non-tradable sector will have the same income but 
the protectable tradable goods in their consumption basket will be more expensive.  So 
the composition of their consumption basket, the nature of the goods that are protected, 
and the degree of substitution, will determine the extent of the decrease in their welfare.18   
Perhaps we can summarize our results in a tentative way:  Our model shows that 
oil windfalls, if spent on the nontradable sector, will have detrimental impact on the 
tradable sectors.  Our results confirm a decrease in the output of the tradable sectors as 
well as a decrease in the respective wages in these sectors.  There seems to be potential 
benefit in a short term tariff application to protect a section of the tradable sector.  
Assuming local economies are not at full employment; this tariff will increase production 
in the protected industries and have minimal impact on the other sectors.  Overall, the 
tariff could raise the total income available for households’ expenditure with varying 
implications on the different households under study. 
 
 
                                                 
18  However, in such a scenario a large number of unemployed households whose consumption has been 
ignored so far due to the lack of income will now be employed by the increase in demand for local goods in 
the protectable tradable sector, non-tradable and potentially unprotectable tradable sectors.  The 
consumption of these previously unemployed households will fuel more demand and the national income 
pie will grow leading to even less unemployment and poverty.
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C. Implications of Learning by Doing on the Model (Period Two) 
 
We have determined that in the short term a tariff could have potential benefits; 
however, what are the medium and long term implications?  Let us assume that in period 
two all the previous assumptions still hold; however, learning by doing leads labor in the 
protected tradable and nontradable sectors to increase productivity whereas labor in the 
unprotected tradable sector will be negatively effected by this development (i.e. a process 
of dislearning).19  Hence, the production functions for the sectors that benefit from 
learning by doing will exhibit increasing returns to scale and the unprotectable tradable 
sector will exhibit decreasing returns to scale.  Thus the production functions now 
become: 
 
yP = lP(1-α /2)    and            YP = NP *  yP      (51) 
yN = lN(1-α / 2)    and            YN = NN *  yN      (52) 
yU = lU(1- 2α)    and            YU = NU *  yU       (53) 
 
Solving for profit maximization of the firms in the different sectors yield: 
 
WP = (1 – α /2) * lP-α /2 * PP         (54) 
lP   = [(1 – α /2) * PP / WP] 2/α        (55) 
yP = [(1 – α / 2) * PP / WP] (1- α )*2/α        (56) 
WU = (1 – 2α) * lU –2α * PU         (57) 
lU = [(1 – 2α) * PU / WU] 1/ 2α         (58) 
yU = [(1 – 2α) * PU / WU] (1- 2α )/2α        (59) 
WN = (1 – α / 2) * lN –α / 2 * PN         (60) 
lN = [(1 – α / 2) * PN / WN] 2/α        (61) 
yN = [(1 – α / 2) * PN / WN] (1- α )*2/α        (62) 
 
                                                 
19 We assume that the unprotected tradable sector will lag behind as resources shift to the now more 
beneficial protected sector.  The non-tradable sector will continue to boom driven by the government’s 
spending. 
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 Preferences of the different groups remains unchanged however the results of the 
market equilibrium change.  Clearing of the nontradable sector will give: 
 
WP =  NN*[(1 – α/2)/WN](1- α)*2/α *P(2- α)/α N – (1 – γ – β)*[π*WU*lU + (1 – θ – π)*WN*lN] – PN*GN   (63)  
    (1 – γ – β)*θ* lP    
 
 Wages in the protected tradable sector are still negatively impacted by 
government consumption of nontradable goods; however, due to the increase in 
productivity in the nontradable sector these wages in the protected sector will be 
positively impacted.  Another way of looking at it can be that the government demand of 
untradable goods requires fewer resources; hence the negative implications of this 
government expenditure are less. 
Equating total expenditure and total income yields the same equation (equation 
(64) is exactly similar to equation (43)); however the dislearning in the unprotected 
tradable sector will actually lead to a decrease in local output of unprotected local goods 
and subsequently to an increase in the imports of these goods.   
 
YP =  PP*CP + PU*(CU – YU) – TRN       (64) 
 PP
∂YP / ∂PP = ∂CP / ∂PP + [TRN + PU*YU – PU*CU)] / P2P        (65) 
 
Equation (64) shows that any decrease in YU will lead to an increase in YP 
(negatively correlated).  However, the derivative of equation (64) shows that as YU 
decreases the positive impact of a tariff decreases as well (and may even make the impact 
of a tariff negative).  Therefore, at best the impact of a tariff in this stage is a minimal 
positive gain in the output of the protected sector and in the worst case (more likely) it 
will lead to a negative impact on YP.  Thus the projected tariff in period one may protect 
the desired sector short term; however, in the long term removing the tariff could have a 
better impact on the protected tradable sector.  
 We can extend the analysis to a third period in which, we assume that there are 
positive returns to government investments in infrastructure, and government expenditure 
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on nontraded goods slows down either due to lower oil revenues or less infrastructure 
projects are needed.  Hence the three sectors of the economy will benefit from the 
government investments made in previous periods and the productivity of labor in all 
three sectors now improves proportionally; to reflect this we assume the production 
functions become: 
 
yP = lP(1-α /6)             (66) 
yN = lN(1-α / 6)             (67) 
yU = lU(1-2α / 3)            (68) 
 
 This will lead to even higher production in all sectors and reduces the negative 
impact of any government expenditure on the tradable sectors.  The reduction in 
government nontraded expenditure would make the application of any tariff clearly 
inefficient and reduces the negative impact this expenditure has on wages in the tradable 
sectors.  If a process of returns to infrastructure is included in the model, the impact of a 
tariff becomes even more negative particularly to the protected sector and may be even to 
total households’ income.  
In summary, a tariff applied to protect a small section of the tradable sector may 
be a good short-term policy to reduce the impact of Dutch Disease on that sector; 
however, in the medium and long term this tariff will hurt the development of the sector 
it is trying to protect.  This is illustrated in Figure (3); the decision tree examines the 
development of local output in the three sectors given the assumptions made in each 
period.  At t = 1, government expenditure on nontradables will lead to increase in output 
in that sector (hence +1 is recorded) and decrease in the output of the unprotectable 
sector.  If the government chooses to protect the protectable sector then this will 
positively impact the output of that sector.  In t = 2, government expenditure will still 
positively drive the output of the nontradable sector; however, due to learning by doing 
the positive impact of protecting the protectable sector is no longer clear.  When the oil 
windfalls cease in the third period, their positive impact on the nontraded sector ceases as  
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Figure 3: 
well.  However, due to returns to infrastructure, now the unprotectable traded sector 
benefits.  The protectable traded sector will benefit only if it is no longer protected by a 
tariff. 
 
V. Case Study: Angola 
 
Angola is a perfect example for our analysis.  Oil revenues in 2005 were more 
than 80% of GDP, 95% of total exports, and around 96% of government revenues.  The 
oil and gas boom has come at the expense of other sectors, particularly agriculture.  
Angola’s traditional agricultural exports (most notably maize and coffee) ceased during 
the post-independence civil conflict and the country became a net importer of all these 
commodities.  Despite the fact that in 2005 the per capita government take from oil 
revenues was more than $1000, this money did not reach most of the population.  In 
short, the oil windfalls created negative pressure on income in the agricultural sector in 
general and rural people in particular. 
For simplicity let us consider protecting maize in Angola.  This is a staple grain 
for a large part of the population and was also a major export crop prior to Angola’s civil 
war and oil boom, reaching export levels of 400,000 metric tons per year in the 1970’s.  
Today, Angola imports more than 250,000 metric tons per year. 
In order to estimate the negative pressure of oil revenues we will use equation 
(34) to determine the impact of oil revenues in 2004 on wages in the protectable tradable 
sector of the economy.  In 2003, the government take from the hydrocarbon sector was 
around $4,000 million.20  In that year total government expenditure was around $6,200 
million and approximately $4,130 of this was expenditure on non-tradable goods.21  In 
2004, government take from the hydrocarbon sector were around $6,000 million and total 
                                                 
20 Data source: The World Bank Group country unit staff estimates. 
21 Data source: Angola Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix. (IMF Country Report No 05/125; April 
2005). According to Angolan authorities and country unit staff estimates, government expenditure was 
around 468 billion kwanza in 2003 (exchange rate during that year averaged 74.6 kwanza per US$).  Hence 
government expenditure was around $6.2 billion.  The government’s non-tradable expenditure includes 
spending on defense (30 billion kwanza), education (32 billion kwanza), health (25 billion kwanza), 
welfare and housing (46 billion), transportation and general public services (106 billion and 69 billion 
respectively). This approximately adds to $4,129 million. 
government expenditure was around $9,350 million and around $6,080 million of this 
expenditure was on non-tradable goods.22  Equation (34) estimates: 
 
(1– γ–β)*θ*lP*WP  =  NN*[(1 - α)/WN] (1- α)/α *P1/α N – (1– γ– β)*[π *WU*lU + (1– θ– π)*WN*lN] – TRN  (34) 
       
 The left hand side represents the amount of money available as compensation for 
labor input in the protectable sector (maize production) of the economy.  In 2003, the 
non-tradable sector (NN*[(1 - α)/WN] (1- α)/α *P1/α N) contributed around $4,510 million to the 
economy.23  Government expenditure on non-tradables (GN) was around $4,130 million 
and the demand of households that work in the unprotectable and non-tradable sectors for 
non-tradable goods ((1– γ– β)*[π *WU*lU + (1 – θ – π)*WN*lN]) was around $350 million24.  
Hence, around $30 million was available as compensation for labor input in the 
protectable sector of the economy.  If we redo the same analysis for 2004, we find that 
the non-tradable sector contributed around $6,450 million25 to the economy; government 
expenditure on non-tradables was $6,080 million and the demand of households that 
work in the unprotectable and non-tradable sectors for non-tradable goods was still 
around $350 million.  Hence in 2004, around $20 million (33% less than 2003) was 
available as compensation for labor input in the protectable sector of the economy.  This 
means either wages in this sector went down or less labor hours were put into production 
(i.e. some land was taken out of production and/or migration of underemployed resources 
to cities). 
Keeping in mind that total government expenditure, in 2003, was around $6,200 
million and approximately $4,130 of this was expenditure on non-tradable goods; net 
                                                 
22 Data source: The World Bank Group country unit staff estimates. The exact figure on government non-
tradable expenditure is not available, we assume that similar to previous years it is around 65% of total 
government expenditures. 
23 Data source: Angola Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix. (IMF Country Report No 05/125; April 
2005).  According to Angolan authorities and country unit staff estimates, the non-tradable section of the 
2003 GDP was around 337 billion kwanza distributed among services (155 billion), commerce (146 
billion), construction, electricity, and water (36 billion).   
24 Data source: Angola Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix. (IMF Country Report No 05/125; April 
2005).  According to the National Institute of Statistics, monthly consumer expenditure included 2,182 
million kwanza on non-tradable goods (housing, health, education, transportation, communication, leisure, 
and recreational activities).  For 2003, these figures would have totaled $350 million for the whole year. 
25 Data source: World Bank, Angola at a Glance, country staff estimates, August 2005. 
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unprotected goods’ imports in the same year were around $4,103 million.26  Angolan 
maize consumption, in 2003, was 0.81 million metric tons and the international price of 
maize was around $100 per metric ton.  Using equation (43) yields YP = 0.55 million 
metric tons of local maize production.  The actual 2003 maize production in Angola 
reported by the FAO and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development was around 
0.54515 million metric tons.27
Let us now assume that a 25% tariff was imposed on maize imports and 65% of 
the tax revenues were also spent on non-tradables.28  Consumption of maize will decrease 
due to the substitution effect.  If we assume 12.5% of consumers can no longer afford to 
buy maize (0.1 million metric tons of demand) and hence buy other alternatives (i.e. the 
price elasticity of maize demand is -0.5).  The substitutes will be other non-maize foods 
(unprotected goods).  Hence, CU will increase by the value of $10 million (the value of 
0.1 metric ton).  Using equation (43) yields a new YP = 0.56 million metric tons of local 
maize production (an increase of around 2% in local output). 
 Therefore, as our model predicts, raising the tariff could reduce the negative 
impact of government expenditure on non-tradable production.  However, what are the 
implications of such a tariff on the households and government incomes?  Obviously, 
government income increases as it collects the returns from the tariff.  Households’ 
income increases as well; this is better illustrated when we apply equation (50) to our 
analysis: 
 
E = PP*YP + PN*YN + PU*YU         (50) 
 
 Before applying a tariff the total amount of money available for households’ 
expenditure (E) is equal to $2,120 million [(100 $/ton)*(0.55 million tons) + ($350 
                                                 
26 Data source: World Trade Organization “Mirror Imports of Angola” reports that imports of unprotected 
goods were around $4,130 million out of which $27 million were Maize imports (0.266 million metric 
tons).  
27 Data source: Special Report “FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Angola”; August 
2004. 
28 In 2003, 65% of government expenditure was on non-tradables.  We are assuming that 65% of the maize 
tariff revenues will also be spent similarly. 
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million) + ($1,715 million29)].  Once a tariff is applied the value of the protected 
production increases by around $15 million (125 $/ton)*(0.56 million tons), and the value 
of the unprotected production as well as that of the non-tradable production will increase 
by around $5 million due to substitution effect  that will be partially supplied locally.30  
Thus E becomes $2,140 million. Hence, the application of this tariff does increase the 
overall amount of money available for households’ expenditure by almost 1%.  More 
importantly this increase is benefiting the poorest of the poor in Angola as our next 
analysis demonstrates.  
 The average farm size in Angola is around 1.5 hectares.  FAO estimates that in 
sub-Saharan Africa yield for maize is around 0.55 tons per hectare.31  Hence in 2003, the 
total revenues for an average farm were on the order of $82.5.  If a tariff had been applied 
this figure would have been $103.  So in addition to an increase in local production our 
proposed tariff would also increase total maize farm revenues by 25%.  However, 
households that do not earn their income from maize production will have to pay more to 
keep their consumption basket unchanged.  Depending on the income of these different 
households the tariff would have reduced their disposable income by 3.5% to 8%.32  
 To summarize, as oil revenues in Angola increase there is definite negative 
impact on the production and wages in the protectable tradable sector of the economy.  
Our case study shows that as oil revenues and subsequently government expenditure 
increased by around 50% from 2003 to 2004 financial compensation for wages in the 
protectable sector decreased by around 33%.  If a 25% tariff was imposed in 2003 on 
imported maize, this would have lead to:  an increase in local maize production by around 
                                                 
29 Data source: Angola Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix. (IMF Country Report No 05/125; April 
2005). Non-maize agricultural activity in Angola in 2003 was valued around $575 million; manufacturing 
activity in the same year was valued around $1,140 million. 
30 Although we believe that maize will most likely be substituted by cassava that is locally produced; other 
unprotected goods and even non-tradable services could possibly act as alternative targets of this substitute 
spending.  Hence, we assume that at least 50% of the 1 million ton of maize demand lost to substitution 
(valued at $10 million in 2003) will be locally supplied.   
31 Data source: Special Report “FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Angola”; August 
2004.  Angolan Maize yield in 2003 varied between 0.15 tons/ha (in Cunene in the south) and 0.8 tons/ha 
(in Cabinda in the north).  The simple average of the 18 regions producing maize in 2003 was 0.55 tons/ha. 
32 The exact impact is difficult to estimate.  According to unpublished research by Paulo Filipe at Cornell 
University maize flour constitutes around 40% of the basic food basket in Angola.  The basic food basket 
includes maize flour, beans, vegetable oil, salt, and cassava. If we assume that the basic food basket varies 
between 40% and 80% of total household income in Angola; then, taking into consideration the possibility 
of substitution (price elasticity for maize demand is -0.5), a 25% increase in the price of maize would 
reduce disposable income by 3.5% to 8%.   
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10,000 metric tons, and a 25% increase in average farm income.  This tariff would have 
also increased total households’ income in Angola by around 1%.   
VI. Conclusion 
 
The current increase in oil prices coupled with the steady increased in production 
in Sub-Saharan Africa will guarantee several oil exporting countries in this region huge 
windfalls.  Although reserves have been continuously growing at a rate exceeding any 
other region in the world, they are still a limited exhaustible resource.  Hence there is a 
unique and limited window of opportunity for these countries to benefit from their 
endowment and achieve poverty alleviation and faster development. 
This paper has explored the consequences of large flows of mineral income for 
the non-oil economy, particularly in terms of the implications for poverty and production 
in non-oil traded sectors in African oil exporting economies.  In doing this we are 
following a well established tradition exemplified by the literature on Dutch Disease and 
the Resource Curse.  We extend the traditional analysis in several ways. 
First, we explicitly treat the mineral income as the result of a total enclave 
production sector with no linkages whatever to the national economy.  This means that 
the only effect of the oil income is via a government spending effect.  This assumption is 
not really an abstraction since it mirrors closely the actual situation for those countries 
producing off-shore oil through contracting arrangements with companies which import 
100% of their inputs. 
Second, we explicitly analyze the effects of an oil boom on a disaggregated 
representation of the non-oil traded sector, part of which is assumed to possess a latent 
comparative advantage in the absence of oil-induced distortions (e.g. agriculture) and part 
of which may not.  This allows analysis of the effects of protectionist policies directed 
toward part of the traded goods sector.  We take a phased approach to the analysis, 
looking at each segment of the oil boom:  an initial period of increasing revenues and a 
subsequent period of decline. 
If there are learning-by-doing effects in play in the traded goods sector, then there 
is a basis for wanting to prevent decline and eventual stagnation of those parts of this 
sector which have a potential comparative advantage since there will be large efficiency 
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losses if these sub-sectors cannot produce at peak efficiency after the oil revenue boom 
has passed.  A preferable way to achieve this would be to invest in technological 
efficiency improvements for this sub-sector since this would prevent additional 
distortions from affecting other parts of the traded goods sector as well as the non-traded 
sectors.  However, we show that a tariff could also be welfare increasing if and only if the 
tariff is confined to the period during which oil revenues are large.  If protection 
continues into the “bust” period of the oil revenue cycle then benefits turn into losses. 
Therefore a tariff could be helpful in the short run on the demand side; however it should 
be associated with infrastructure investments to support the country’s comparative 
advantages and the supply side. 
This analysis is relevant to the current situation in some African countries where 
the relevant traded subsector is agriculture, which employs more than half the population 
and where most of the extreme poverty is located.  In essence, the benefits of policies 
promoting this trade-exposed sector accrue almost entirely to those who most need them 
while the costs fall on the rich and on those parts of the poor population who consume 
but do not produce agricultural products.  Herein lies the political economy issue for 
African governments:  While helping the agricultural sector has positive poverty 
implications for the largest number of people it has negative implications for those who 
are located where they can most directly affect the government: i.e. in cities. 
The paper considers as a numerical example the case of Angola illustrating the 
relevance of this analysis empirically.  Indeed, this case is found to parallel our analysis 
very closely in terms of quantitative measures of revenue flows and sectoral results.  In 
particular, the enclave nature of oil production and the appropriation of the rents by the 
government generate a situation where the majority of the population may not share in 
any of the benefits of oil production but is nevertheless subject to the negative effects 
inflicted on non-oil traded production through their reliance on agricultural production.  
In such a situation all of the positive effects of tariff protection accrue to the poorest who 
most need them while the usual negative effects fall disproportionately on the rich.  
However, it remains the case that any tariff protection must be temporary if it is to be 
welfare increasing.  The prospects for achieving this must therefore temper any attempt to 
base policy on analytical results.
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